Under uniform pricing a monopolist cannot make a positive profit in equilibrium. I analyze how differential pricing can be exploited by a natural monopolist to deter entry when entry is costless. In a two-stage game with price competition before quantity competition I show that the incumbent firm can deter entry and make a positive profit in equilibrium. The incumbent sets two different prices, the low price to deter entry and the high price to generate profit. Entry is not possible because of scale effects. If dumping is allowed for all firms no positive profits are realizable, but welfare is reduced. I show that for some parameter values the incumbent is forced to engage in a stunt (i.e., set a negative low price) to keep entrants out.
Introduction
The issue of entry deterrence in natural monopoly models merited a lot of attention in the eighties. Baumol et al. (1982) put forward their theory of contestable markets as a unifying pure theory on the issue. In the discussion on contestable markets, Tirole (1988) argued that it is better to study the equilibria of an appropriate game than the contestable outcomes. He considered a two-stage game with price-setting before quantity-setting. It can be shown that under uniform pricing an equilibrium exists in such a game and the firms make zero profits (Tirole, 1988) . The timing in the game has been criticized on the ground that prices seem to adjust more rapidly than quantities. In this paper, I provide a justification for the use of the two-stage game when prices are set first. The incumbent firm can use differential pricing to deter entry and make a positive profit in equilibrium. The typical economic situation is the following. By setting a low price one firm attracts a first group of customers to gain the advantage over competitors, and subsequently it exploits the increasing returns to scale technology to generate a profit. Such a "loss leading" strategy is not an uncommon marketing strategy. For instance, in the airline industry the first cus-tomers can often buy at a lower price than the last customers. I show that differential pricing can lead to a Pareto improvement over uniform pricing. Firms can deter entry and make a profit while consumers are not worse off (and possibly better off) than under uniform pricing.
I distinguish various regimes of differential pricing. I allow for the possibility that pricing below average costs, which I call dumping, is prohibited, since that is the case in some countries, particularly in the United States where the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly .... " (Scherer and Ross, 1990) . The Robinson-Patman Act is controversial since the effects of price discrimination on competition and welfare are by no means clear. I characterize the equilibria under uniform pricing and under the various regimes of differential pricing. I show that in most of the cases the equilibria are unique under fairly mild assumptions about cost and demand. I show that welfare is the highest when dumping is prohibited. So when dumping is used to deter potential entry, the Robinson-Patman Act is justified.
Perry (1984) scrutinizes the contestability hypothesis in a multipleprice environment. His most important result is that, despite free entry, a natural monopolist can make a positive profit and prevent entry. I reestablish this result in a more general framework. I allow for arbitrary sharing rules and I show that Perry's result only holds if firms are not allowed to price below average costs. 1 Moreover, I show that if dumping is allowed it is possible that incumbents must set a negative price to deter entry, i.e., the incumbent must engage in a stunt to keep entrants out.
Differential pricing (see Braeutigam, 1989 ) is closest to third-degree price discrimination, the difference being that firms set prices and quantities without the requirement of using exogenous information to segment the market into identifiable subsets of consumers. 2
One may associate incumbent-entry problems with a sequential framework where the incumbent commits to a price-quantity pair after which potential entrants decide upon entry. However, equilibria in the simultaneous two-stage game are equivalent to the equilibria of the
